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CRIMINAL LAW—INVISIBLE IN THE COURTROOM TOO: MODIFY
ING THE LAW OF SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR
WHITE PRIVILEGE1
INTRODUCTION
On February 3, 2008, two men viciously taunted a University of
Massachusetts Amherst (UMass) student through his dormitory
window.2 “Come out and fight!” they urged him.3 The men were
not students and had come to UMass to socialize.4 At the time of
this exchange, they were both “highly intoxicated[.]”5 When the
student demanded that they leave him alone, the men broke his
window.6 Then, after gaining access to his dormitory, one of the
men turned the verbal assault physical, throwing a punch that broke
the student’s nose.7 Believing that his life was in danger, the stu
dent defended himself with a knife.8 When he was able, he escaped
1. The defendant in Commonwealth v. Vassell, the principal case discussed in this
Note, was represented by attorneys David Hoose and Luke Ryan of the law firm Sas
son, Turnbull, Ryan, & Hoose. Attorney Luke Ryan is the author’s husband.
2. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Commonwealth v.
Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Motion to
Dismiss].
3. Rachel Anthony-Levine, A Black Student Fights for His Life in Massachusetts,
CAMPUS PROGRESS (Apr. 27. 2010), http://campusprogress.org/articles/a_black_student
_fights_for_his_life_in_massachusetts.
4. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 13; see also Commonwealth’s Preliminary
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, Com
monwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2009) [hereinafter
Commonwealth’s Opposition].
5. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 4; Commonwealth’s Petition for
Extraordinary Relief Pursuant to G.L. c.211, § 3, Commonwealth v. Vassell, SJC-2009
231 (Mass. May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Petition for Relief]; see also Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 2, at 13, 27 (relating how one of the men “said that he had no more than ten
beers” and the other man “admitted that he had a few beers”) (internal brackets and
quotations omitted); Defendant’s Motion to Strike References to the Trial and Out
come of Docket Number 0898CR290 at 15, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008
00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Motion to Strike] (noting that the
blood alcohol levels of the two men were .18 and .24, above the legal limit of .08).
6. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 1; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3
(reporting that when Vassell told Bowes and Bosse through his window that “he wasn’t
going to fight . . . [they] smashed [the] window”); Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra
note 4, at 4 (“The encounter culminated in one of the defendant’s room window panes
. . . being broken.”).
7. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 1; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3.
8. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 1, 11; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note
3 (reporting that Vassell’s neighbor, Barbara Rutman, had observed Vassell “pull[ ] out
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from his attackers, joining fellow students who had observed the
fight from behind an interior dormitory door.9 Though they had
been stabbed, the men pounded on the door and continued to taunt
the student.10 These men, John Bowes and Jonathan Bosse, are
white.11 The student, Jason Vassell, is black.12 From the moment
Bowes and Bosse first addressed Vassell through his dormitory win
dow, the language they used was brutally racist.13
Even though Bowes and Bosse had instigated the fight, Vassell
was the only one of the three men who was arrested and vigorously
prosecuted, leading many in the community to decry law enforce
ment’s response as racist.14 Indeed racism likely fueled the arrest
and prosecution of Jason Vassell, and it was on this basis that his
defense attorneys sought to dismiss the charges against him in a
motion to dismiss for selective prosecution.15 However, in addition
to racism, this Note posits that Bowes’s and Bosse’s white privilege,
which can be understood as an “invisible [knapsack] of unearned
assets,”16 powerfully influenced law enforcement’s response to the
February 3rd altercation. White privilege, though it was never ex
plicitly named, was certainly lurking.
a knife and [tell Bosse and Bowes] he didn’t want to use it and [that] they should leave”
once they had gained entry to his dormitory and continued to verbally accost him. To
Rutman, “it looked like the first punch was thrown by the taller of the white males
[Bosse]”).
9. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 6-7.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 3; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3.
12. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 4; see also Anthony-Levine, supra note 3.
13. See Anthony-Levine, supra note 3 (reporting that according to Vassell’s
neighbor, Barbara Rutman, Bowes, and Bosse shouted at Vassell, “You’re a dirty nig
ger. Come out and fight . . .”); Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 4
(“Bowes cursed at the defendant by uttering profanity and racial epithets or slurs.”);
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 4-7 (documenting the barrage of racist language
directed at Vassell).
14. Anthony-Levine, supra note 3 (“Many concerned citizens . . . joined the or
ganization Justice for Jason, which has had a constant presence at every court proceed
ing related to the case. The group believes the disparity in charges in the case is racially
motivated.”).
15. See infra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of Vassell’s Motion to Dismiss for selec
tive prosecution. The author generally uses the term, “selective enforcement,” though
when referring specifically to Commonwealth v. Vassell, she uses the term, “selective
prosecution,” to remain consistent with the pleadings.
16. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFER
ENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 17 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1996) (citing
Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRI
TUALITY, Jan.-Feb. 1992 at 33).
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White privilege has been scantily mentioned in any subject
area of the case law.17 Specifically in the context of selective en
forcement claims, courts focus on whether people of color are ar
rested or prosecuted for belonging to a racial minority group (a
result of racism) rather than on whether people like Bowes and
Bosse evade arrest or prosecution for being white (a result of white
privilege).18 One problem with the practice of focusing on the de
fendant’s race in selective enforcement cases is that differential
treatment is not necessarily the result of racial animus.19 If racial
animus, conscious or unconscious, is not the cause of a particular
instance of selective enforcement, then the focus on the defendant’s
race is misguided. Another flaw with existing selective enforcement
law is that it only deals in half-truths. By keeping the invisible
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 703 (Mass. 2008) (observ
ing that “Justices of [the Supreme Judicial Court] have expressed considerable concern
about [the problem of driving while black]”); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (noting that “[i]t is indisputable . . . that the police may not
stop a motorist based on race . . .”). Since both cases deal with racial profiling, it is
logical that the courts focus on the question of whether people of color are targeted
because they belong to a racial minority group. Yet the courts fail to address the in
verse issue—whether white motorists are treated preferentially. See also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (focusing on the harms created for the minority
group by the unequal application of laws rather than on the benefits generated for the
dominant group).
19. See generally Donna Coker, Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in
the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 860 (2003) (discussing
how the “intentional discrimination standard is wholly inadequate to address most of
the racial disparity in the criminal justice system”). In some jurisdictions, a showing of
discriminatory intent is necessary to prove selective enforcement. See, e.g., Jones v.
Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1278 (Ariz. 2005) (“Because a selective enforcement claim rests
on an assertion that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated, the claimant must
demonstrate that state action ‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.’”) (emphasis added). This, however, is not a requirement in
Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 233 (Mass. 1978).
Though Massachusetts defendants must overcome a presumption that discriminatory
intent was not a factor in their arrests or prosecutions, their burden does not include a
mandate to demonstrate discriminatory intent. Id. The focus of this Note is on Massa
chusetts’ selective enforcement law and a more in-depth look at jurisdictional variances
is beyond its scope. However, in jurisdictions where a showing of discriminatory intent
or racial animus is required, some selective enforcement claims may fail for the reason
that a particular act of selective enforcement may have been caused not by racial ani
mus, but rather by white privilege. Unearthing unconscious racism with a legal stan
dard that requires a showing of intentional discrimination may be nearly impossible.
See Coker, supra at 860; infra note 25 (discussing unconscious racism). Using the same
legal standard to reveal white privilege, then, is entirely impracticable. For this reason,
jurisdictions like Arizona, which require a showing of discriminatory intent, should for
mally recognize white privilege in order to make their laws more effective in remedying
instances of selective enforcement. See Jones, 110 P.3d at 1278.
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knapsack (and the very real and entirely unearned benefits con
tained therein) completely shrouded, this area of the law cannot
achieve one of the goals it aims to address: ending racial bias in the
enforcement of criminal laws.20
Using Commonwealth v. Vassell as an illustration, this Note ar
gues that the law of selective enforcement in Massachusetts should
explicitly account for white privilege.21 Part I looks at law enforce
ment’s response to the February 3rd altercation, exploring the in
terplay between discretion, discrimination, and privilege. Part II
examines the development of the law of selective enforcement in
Massachusetts, after taking a brief look at two seminal federal
cases. Part III addresses the concept of white privilege and the role
it played in Commonwealth v. Vassell. Finally, Part IV argues that
the law of selective enforcement is ripe for the incorporation of
white privilege into its formal legal doctrine. Furthermore, a legal
recognition of white privilege is necessary in order to curb the abil
ity of courts hostile to selective enforcement claims from too readily
dismissing such claims. To this end, this Note proposes language
modifying the Massachusetts law of selective enforcement to ac
count for white privilege.
I.

COMMONWEALTH V. VASSELL—A CASE OF DISCRETION,
DISCRIMINATION, AND PRIVILEGE

Following the February 3rd altercation, the UMass Police De
partment (UMPD) arrested Jason Vassell and charged him with two
counts each of armed assault with intent to murder, and aggravated
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.22 Four days after the
incident, the UMPD filed a criminal complaint against John Bowes,
asking that he be charged with disorderly conduct, a civil rights vio
lation resulting in bodily injury, and assault and battery to intimi

20. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (“[The provisions of the Fourteenth Amend
ment] are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”).
21. This Note focuses exclusively on Massachusetts’ selective enforcement law,
with a brief look at two key federal cases. See infra Part II.A. Of course, a change in
Massachusetts law can have implications for other jurisdictions as well.
22. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 22; see also Petition for Relief, supra note
5, at 1-2.
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date with bodily injury.23 The UMPD never filed a criminal
complaint against Jonathan Bosse.24
It is not unusual for police officers to perform their official du
ties in a discriminatory manner.25 When acting with discretion in
terms of whom they choose to apprehend, arrest, or charge, police
officers access and act upon their “subjective beliefs, biases,
hunches, and prejudices.”26 Accordingly, the UMPD may have
targeted Vassell because of prejudices they held, even uncon
sciously, about African American men.27 The inverse is also true.
Since police officers “are not required to make an arrest when they
observe conduct creating probable cause” that a crime has oc
curred, “their [use of] discretion may result in the failure to detain
or arrest whites who commit acts for which their African American
counterparts would often be detained or arrested.”28 The February
3rd altercation provides a stark illustration of this practice. Despite
witness statements that the police took of Bowes’s and Bosse’s
criminal behavior, the officers did not arrest either of the two white
men.29 Unlike Vassell, Bowes and Bosse benefited from the
UMPD’s use of discretion.

23. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 29-30. Bowes was never arrested; rather,
he was informed of these charges when the clerk-magistrate sent him a summons on
February 8, 2008 in anticipation of his February 26th arraignment. Id. at 30.
24. Id. at 20.
25. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discre
tion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 26-27 (1998) (“Police officers often act in a discrimina
tory manner in the performance of their official duties when they disproportionately
stop, detain, and arrest African American men, with or without probable cause, and
with or without articulable suspicion.”).
26. Id. at 27. See generally Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Gimme Some More: Centering
Gender and Inequality in Criminal Justice and Discretion Discourse, 18 AM. U. J. GEN
DER SOC. POL’Y & L. 607, 613 (2010) for a discussion of “the interstices of discretion,”
places in the criminal justice system where police and prosecutors can make decisions
without transparency and accountability.
27. See, e.g., M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 109, 112 (2009) (“[D]eeply entrenched police practices [like the practice of racial
profiling, persist because of] the myth of inherent black criminality . . . stubbornly en
trenched in American consciousness.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Coker,
supra note 19, at 864 (“[T]he deeply embedded belief among whites of black criminality
‘create[s] the criminalblackman.’”) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); Geiza Var
gas-Vargas, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 41, 51 (2005)
(discussing the “white conception of blacks and criminals as synonymous”).
28. Davis, supra note 25, at 27 (emphasis added).
29. See Anthony-Levine, supra note 3 (describing how police permitted Bowes
and Bosse to leave the police station after the incident).
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Prosecutors, too, may conduct their official duties in a discrimi
natory manner.30 Like police officers, they enjoy a considerable
amount of discretion.31 On February 4, 2008, the office of the
Northwestern District Attorney, Elizabeth D. Scheibel (DA)
moved to have Vassell detained as a dangerous person.32 The DA
asserted that “[n]o conditions of release imposed upon the defen
dant [would] reasonably assure the safety of . . . John Bowes and
Jonathan Bosse, or the community.”33 With this motion, the prose
cutor took the position that Vassell posed a serious threat, despite
the fact that he had no prior record of arrest.34 Unlike Vassell,
Bowes and Bosse had a long history of engaging in criminal behav
ior,35 and still the DA, like the UMPD, chose to treat the white men
preferentially. The prosecutor did not seek to detain Bowes as a
dangerous person or impose any conditions on his release,36 and the
DA never prosecuted Bosse for any of his criminal conduct.37
The preferential treatment that Bowes and Bosse received,
first from the UMPD and later from the DA, is an example of white
privilege. The contents of their invisible knapsacks proved ex
tremely valuable to Bowes and Bosse after the February 3rd alter
cation. As a result of their whiteness, the men received the benefit
of the doubt in circumstances where evidence indicated that they
had committed hate crimes, damaged public property, instigated a
fight, and broken a man’s nose.38 This exercise of white privilege so
tainted the prosecution’s case against Vassell that he and his attor

30. Davis, supra note 25, at 32 (“Like police officers, prosecutors often make de
cisions that discriminate against African American victims and defendants.”).
31. See, e.g., Renée M. Landers, Sexual Activity Between Minors, Prostitution, and
Prosecutorial Discretion; What Difference Should Age and Sex Make?, BOSTON B. J. 11
May/June 2009 (critiquing “[t]he notion that prosecutors should have unreviewable dis
cretion in charging and other decisions that precede judicial involvement . . .”).
32. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 24.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see Fred Contrada, Jason Vassell Probation Ends After 21/2 years; Support
ers Rally in Northampton, MASSLIVE.COM (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.masslive.com/
news/index.ssf/2010/08/jason_vassell_probation_ends_a.html for an example of how the
DA’s office portrayed Vassell. In this article, the author notes that the original prose
cuting attorney in Vassell’s case “called [him] a menace to society.” Id. (quoting UMass
professor emeritus of Afro-American Studies, Ekwueme Michael Thelwell).
35. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 18; see infra note 181.
36. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 30.
37. Id. at 35.
38. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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neys sought a dismissal of the indictment on the basis of selective
prosecution.39
II.

THE LAW

OF

SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT

Before discussing the development of the law of selective en
forcement in Massachusetts, this section will briefly address two
seminal Supreme Court cases. The first provides a foundational
look at the concept of equal protection.40 The second explores the
separation of powers doctrine.41
A. Equal Protection and the Separation of Powers Doctrine: The
Federal Approach
In its 1886 Yick Wo decision, the Supreme Court famously
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the government
from “mak[ing] unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances.”42 There, a San Francisco ordinance pro
hibited laundry operators from running their businesses out of
wooden buildings without first obtaining the permission of city su
pervisors.43 The supervisors refused to grant permission to over 200
Chinese laundry operators, while simultaneously granting permis
sion to eighty laundry operators who were not Chinese.44 Finding
no apparent reason for the differential treatment afforded to Chi
nese versus non-Chinese laundry operators, the Court concluded
“that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and national
ity to which the petitioners belong.”45 Accordingly, the Court or
dered that the Chinese laundry operators, who had been jailed for
operating their businesses without permission, be released.46 The
spirit of this seminal equal protection case—that the law must not
39. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2. Before the motion was heard on its merits,
the Commonwealth agreed to drop the criminal charges against Vassell in exchange for
an additional two months of pretrial probation. James F. Lowe, Probation for Vassell:
“Regret” Admitted, but not Guilt in 2008 Stabbing at UMass Dorm, GAZETTENET.COM
(June 5, 2010), http://www.gazettenet.com/2010/06/05/probation-for-vassell.
40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
41. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996).
42. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.
43. Id. at 368.
44. Id. at 374.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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be administered “with an evil eye and an unequal hand”47—sits at
the core of all selective enforcement claims.48
Another concept integral to the law of selective enforcement is
the judiciary’s interest in preserving the separation of powers, re
sulting in its great deference to the prosecution. In United States v.
Armstrong, multiple black defendants were indicted on charges of
conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute over fifty grams of
crack cocaine.49 The defendants filed motions both to dismiss their
indictments on the basis of selective prosecution and also to obtain
discovery that might substantiate their claim.50 Reasoning that it
would be a misappropriation of power for it to interfere with the
responsibilities of the executive’s delegates, the Court found a pre
sumption of prosecutorial regularity and denied the defendants’ dis
covery requests.51 The Court ruled that only clear evidence of
improper conduct could defeat the broad exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.52 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court was concerned
that any less stringent standard would “undermine prosecutorial ef
fectiveness” and jeopardize the separation of powers.53 Under
Armstrong, the separation of powers doctrine requires that the gov
ernment be afforded significant discretion in choosing whom to
prosecute criminally. This is true of Massachusetts’ selective prose
cution law, as well.54
47. Id. at 373-74.
48. See infra Part II.B.
49. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the appropriate discovery standard for defendants seek
ing to demonstrate selective prosecution. Id. at 461; see infra note 96 for a discussion of
the discovery standard promulgated in Armstrong.
50. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459.
51. Id. at 464.
52. Id. See Coker, supra note 19, at 827 for a discussion of the “Catch-22” cre
ated by an evidentiary standard that requires a defendant to present clear evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct in order to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct.
53. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. In addition to its interest in remaining deferential
to the government, the Court was concerned about the application of Rule 16(a)(1)(c)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 462. It reasoned that the expansive
discovery permitted by the rule applies to “shield” defenses only (i.e. defenses made in
direct response to the government’s case in chief) rather than “sword” defenses (i.e.
challenges, such as selective prosecution, to the government’s conduct in prosecuting
the case). Id.
54. In a recent decision, the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts addressed
the issue of prosecutorial discretion in the context of preserving the separation of pow
ers. Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Mass. 2009). “[J]udicial re
view of [the prosecution’s] decisions must proceed circumspectly lest we intrude on a
function constitutionally vouchsafed to another branch of government.” Id. The Court
warned, however, that “prosecutorial discretion may not transgress the limits set out in
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B. The Law of Selective Enforcement in Massachusetts
This section now turns to Massachusetts where defendants face
fewer barriers in demonstrating selective enforcement than their
federal counterparts.55 Commencing in 1977, with its decision in
Commonwealth v. King, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has de
veloped a strong body of law for Massachusetts defendants seeking
to demonstrate selective enforcement.56
1. Establishing the Tripartite Burden: Two Foundational
Cases on Race- and Sex-Based Selective
Enforcement
In Commonwealth v. King, three female defendants presented
the SJC with “a broad scale attack on the Massachusetts law against
prostitution.”57 Although the court refused to reverse the defend
ants’ convictions for prostitution and common night walking,58 it
did affirm one of their equal protection arguments, thereby estab
lishing the foundation for subsequent selective enforcement claims
in Massachusetts.59
The defendants alleged that their convictions were the result of
an unconstitutional and discriminatory application of the law.60
Specifically, they argued that “law enforcement policies and prac
tices [existed] whereby female prostitutes were prosecuted under
[anti-prostitution laws] while male prostitutes and male customers
our Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions; in the final analysis, it is the judicial
branch’s solemn duty to ensure that such overreaching does not occur.” Id.
55. See Coker, supra note 19, at 829 (“The Supreme Court’s discovery rule in
United States v. Armstrong . . . made it practically impossible for defendants to prevail
on selective prosecution claims.”). See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how the Armstrong discovery rule compares to the equivalent rule in
Massachusetts.
56. Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1977).
57. Id. at 198.
58. Id. at 199. The court observed that some statistical evidence, which the de
fendants provided in their appellate briefs, seemed to support one of their equal protec
tion claims, but since the evidence had not been presented to the trial court, it could not
be considered during appellate review. Id. at 204-05. Unable to consider this evidence,
the court held that the record was too “conjectural” to come to any conclusions about
the veracity of the defendants’ claim. Id. This corollary issue in King—statistical evi
dence used for the purpose of demonstrating selective enforcement—foreshadows a
central issue in a case adjudicated by the SJC twenty-one years later. Commonwealth v.
Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688 (Mass. 2008); see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
59. King, 372 N.E.2d at 207.
60. Id. at 203. The defendants raised a host of other constitutional challenges as
well, including due process and the right of privacy. Id. at 201-03. None of these per
tain to the issue of selective enforcement.
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of prostitutes were not.”61 The court disposed of the second issue,
reasoning that it was the legislature’s prerogative to criminalize the
prostitute’s conduct and not the customer’s.62
However, the SJC did not so readily dismiss the first issue:
whether law enforcement discriminated between female and male
prostitutes.63 There, the court held that female defendants charged
with prostitution could win a motion to dismiss on a “showing that
the police department or the prosecutor’s office followed an unjus
tifiable policy of selective enforcement against female prostitutes
and not male prostitutes.”64 A defendant could meet her initial
burden65 of showing selective enforcement by “presenting . . . evi
dence which strongly suggests or raises a reasonable inference that
there existed in connection with her arrest or prosecution a sexbased distinction in law enforcement practice in the consistent and
unjustifiable failure to prosecute male prostitutes.”66 If the defen
dant successfully raised a “reasonable inference” of sex-based selec
tive enforcement, the Commonwealth would have to “rebut that
61. Id. at 204.
62. Id. Nevertheless Chief Justice Hennessey, in his concurrence, urged the
Court to
[recognize] the validity of the defendants’ argument that unlawful discrimina
tion in enforcement can be proved by a showing that the police department or
prosecutor’s office followed an unjustifiable policy of prosecuting prostitutes
and not their customers. This policy in turn may be shown to be sex-based
discrimination (and thus subject to strict scrutiny) by a showing that most
prostitutes are women and most customers are male.
Id. at 207 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted). The Chief Justice went on
to explain that “even though the Legislature has made no express provision for the
prosecution of the customers of prostitutes, the existence of correlative statutory crimes
[e.g. lewd, wanton and lascivious speech or behavior] . . . may give support to a charge
of unconstitutional discrimination . . . .” Id. at 208 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring).
This proposition gained traction in Commonwealth v. Lafaso where a Massachu
setts Appeals Court held that the defendant, a woman charged with common night
walking, had raised a reasonable inference of selective prosecution by presenting evi
dence that the “police not only did not arrest the men who picked up the defendant,
they made no effort to investigate or obtain additional evidence to support the prosecu
tion of the defendant’s clients or johns in general.” Commonwealth v. Lafaso, 727
N.E.2d 850, 854 (Mass. 2000).
63. King, 372 N.E.2d at 204-05.
64. Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 207. The defendant bears the initial burden, because courts “presume
that criminal arrests and prosecutions are undertaken in good faith, without [the] intent
to discriminate.” Id. As previously discussed, courts afford the prosecution broad def
erence at the outset in an effort to preserve the separation of powers. See supra Part
II.A.
66. King, 372 N.E.2d at 207.
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inference or suffer [a dismissal of] the underlying complaint . . . .”67
Though the court rejected the King defendants’ particular argu
ments, it established principles it would recall in future selective
enforcement claims.
The year after it decided King, the SJC revisited the issue of
selective enforcement in Commonwealth v. Franklin, permitting it
to more finely tune the applicable legal standard.68 Boston during
the mid-1970s was a place of great racial tension, and the East Bos
ton Maverick Street Housing Project, in particular, was the locus of
ongoing racially motivated conflict.69 The Franklin court described
the environment in the following way:
[G]angs of white youths began roaming the housing project, ston
ing the homes of black residents, breaking their windows,
firebombing their apartments and assaulting the blacks them
selves. When asked to make arrests, the police refused and, in
some cases, did so mockingly. When the black residents sought
to have complaints issued in the East Boston District Court on
their own, the clerk first held hearings and then refused, although
he routinely issued complaints against black persons without
hearings when such complaints were sought by whites.70

These were the circumstances in which two black men armed them
selves and were subsequently charged with assault and battery with
dangerous weapons and the unlawful possession of firearms, among
other related charges.71 Both men moved to dismiss their indict
ments for “being selective and racially motivated.”72
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227 (Mass. 1978).
Id. at 232. See generally JACK TAGER, BOSTON RIOTS: THREE CENTURIES OF
SOCIAL VIOLENCE 194 (2001) for a discussion on how “[t]he violence that occurred in
Boston from 1974 to 1976 astounded the nation and smeared its reputation as the cradle
of liberty and hub of intellectual liberalism.” East Boston was one of several “defended
neighborhoods,” where the residents “shared an impulse to stop time, to resist change,
and to hold fast to an ideal of society as it had been before the upheavals of the 1960s.”
RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN
THE 1960S AND 1970S 108-09 (1991). One of the changes these neighborhoods most
strongly resisted was the busing of public school children by a city attempting to comply
with court orders for desegregation. Id. at 1. Nowhere in Boston did a majority of
residents strongly support busing, but in several neighborhoods, East Boston included,
busing was met with “strong disapproval (over 70 percent).” Id. at 109. This disap
proval was the source of great racial tension and ensuing violence. Id.
70. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d at 232.
71. Id. at 230.
72. Id. The defendants’ motions were denied, but upon appeal, the SJC found
error in the trial court’s rulings and remanded the case for a new hearing. Id. at 230-31.
The SJC noted that this had been a case of first impression for the trial court, and that
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Drawing from a large array of federal and state cases, and
building on the principles established in King, the SJC formulated
the following selective enforcement legal standard.73 In order to
meet the initial burden in raising a reasonable inference of imper
missible discrimination, defendants must demonstrate (1) “that a
broader class of persons than those prosecuted has violated the
law,” (2) “that failure to prosecute was either consistent or deliber
ate,” and (3) “that the decision not to prosecute was based on an
impermissible classification such as race, religion, or sex.”74 Once a
defendant has satisfied this tripartite burden, the prosecution must
rebut the inference or suffer a dismissal of the underlying claim.75
The SJC found that the defendants had successfully raised a reason
able inference that the prosecution had been motivated by the im
permissible classification of race.76 The onus, then, was transferred
onto the prosecution to rebut that inference.77
2. Sharpening the Sword for a Robust Defense: Recent
Selective Enforcement Cases on Evidentiary and
Discovery Matters78
In some instances where defendants have made a selective en
forcement claim, the proper remedy is the suppression of evidence
rather than a total dismissal of the charges.79 Pursuant to the exclu
sionary rule80 and the related fruits doctrine,81 evidence obtained in
the course of unconstitutional police conduct cannot be used to ob
“the judge was presented with a constitutional concept (discriminatory enforcement) as
to which there were no Massachusetts precedents for his guidance.” Id. at 231 n.3.
While Commonwealth v. King addresses the issue of sex-based selective enforcement,
that case was decided by the SJC after the Franklin trial had been concluded. Id.
73. Id. at 233-34.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 234.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 53 for a brief discussion of the “sword defense.”
79. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (explaining that
suppression was the proper remedy in a case where “[the defendant] does not contend
that he was charged . . . because of his race, and consequently has not moved to dismiss
[the] charge on the ground of selective enforcement[,]” but rather that the vehicle was
stopped because of its occupants’ skin color) (emphasis added).
80. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 647 (9th ed. 2009) (“A [ ] rule that excludes or
suppresses evidence.”).
81. See id. at 740 (“The rule that evidence derived from an illegal search, arrest,
or interrogation is inadmissible because the evidence (the ‘fruit’) was tainted by the
illegality (the ‘poisonous tree’).”).
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tain a conviction.82 Suppression is considered appropriate to deter
future police misconduct.83
Suppressing cocaine seized from the defendant would have
been the appropriate remedy in Commonwealth v. Lora had the
defendant successfully demonstrated selective enforcement.84 In
Lora, a police officer pulled over a vehicle when its driver commit
ted a minor traffic infraction.85 Before activating his cruiser’s blue
lights, the officer observed the dark skin color of the vehicle’s occu
pants.86 In the course of the traffic stop, the officer discovered co
caine in a small glassine bag on the floor of the vehicle.87 The
defendant filed a motion to suppress in response to the charge of
trafficking cocaine.88 He alleged that the officer had made the deci
sion to pull over the vehicle because of its occupants’ skin color,
thus “impermissibly engag[ing] in the practice of racial profiling.”89
The SJC in Lora—though it ruled against the defendant—
made a significant contribution to the law of selective enforcement.
First, it held that the suppression of evidence is indeed the proper
remedy in cases where traffic stops are the result of racial profil
ing.90 Furthermore, the court ruled that a defendant may use statis
tical evidence to meet the initial burden of “rais[ing] a reasonable
inference of impermissible discrimination.”91 Nevertheless, the
82. See Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 698 (“The suppression of evidence under the exclu
sionary rule is a ‘judicially created remedy,’ whose ‘prime purpose is to deter future
unlawful police conduct.’”) (citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 691. The driver had failed to operate in the right travel lane. Id.
86. Id. The defendant was riding in the passenger’s seat of the vehicle. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 692.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 699. Still, the court noted that the evidence should not be suppressed
on these grounds if “the connection between the unconstitutional stop by the police and
the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.’” Id. at 699-700.
Racial profiling can be defined as “when law enforcement interprets race as ‘a
mark of increased risk of criminality.’” Steven Wu, Comment, The Secret Ambition of
Racial Profiling, 115 YALE L.J. 491, 492 (2005) (citations omitted). In the context of
traffic stops, racial profiling “has resulted in the proportion of African-Americans
among the drivers searched by police far exceeding the proportion in the general popu
lation of drivers.” Melissa Whitney, Note, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in
Traffic Stops and Searches: Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory In
tent, 49 B.C. L. REV. 263, 264 (2008) (internal brackets and quotations omitted).
91. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 701; cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287, 293 (1987)
(concluding that “statistical proof normally must present a ‘stark’ pattern to be ac
cepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution” in a case
where a black defendant unsuccessfully sought to demonstrate that his death sentence
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court was not persuaded that the evidence provided by the instant
defendant was sufficient to meet this burden.92
At the conclusion of its Lora decision, the SJC noted that
“[t]he practical weight” of the defendant’s initial burden to produce
evidence that similarly situated persons were treated differently be
cause of their race may be “daunting.”93 Yet, the court opined, the
hurdle was not “impossible” to surmount.94 One manner in which a
defendant may seek to demonstrate selective enforcement is by way
of evidence obtained from the prosecution through discovery.95
Both the Supreme Court and the SJC have considered the same
question: what is “the showing necessary for a defendant to be enti
tled to discovery on a claim that the prosecuting attorney singled
him out for prosecution on the basis of [an impermissible classifica
tion?]”96 In the past few years, several cases have come before the
SJC that have permitted it to develop its response to this question.
was unconstitutional, because based on a statistical analysis of over 2,000 murder cases,
black defendants convicted of murdering white victims were more likely to be sen
tenced to death than any other sort of defendant/victim pairings in racial makeup). But
see Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1279 (Ariz. 2005) (“[W]hile helpful, purely statisti
cal evidence is rarely sufficient to support an equal protection claim.”) (citations
omitted).
92. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 704. The court came to “the inescapable conclusion that
the use of census benchmarking to compare the demographics of a small community
with citation ratios on a major interstate highway, which happens to pass through it, is
unreliable and not accepted in the scientific community.” Id. at 702. See also State v.
Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) for a discussion of the use of statisti
cal evidence in demonstrating the existence of racial profiling. “Statistics may be used
to make out a case of targeting minorities . . . provided the comparison is between the
racial composition of the motorist population violating the traffic laws and the racial
composition of those arrested for traffic infractions on the relevant roadway patrolled
by the police agency.” Id. at 360. Soto was successful in demonstrating racial profiling,
while Lora was not, because the two defendants measured the alleged examples of
racially-motivated traffic stops against different benchmarks. See Lora, 886 N.E.2d at
702 (“Having concluded that properly gathered, analyzed, and relevant statistical data
may be used to meet a defendant’s burden”—as was the case in Soto—the court then
found that Lora’s benchmarking data was “unreliable and not accepted in the scientific
community.”).
93. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 703. For a discussion of a related issue—the barriers to
demonstrating discriminatory impact faced by plaintiffs in equal protection suits in re
sponse to law enforcement abuses—see generally Whitney, supra note 90, at 282.
94. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 703.
95. Vassell, for example, sought to obtain discovery that would aid him in demon
strating selective enforcement. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Mo
tion for Discovery Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR
2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Motion for Discovery].
96. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). In this sort of discovery
request, the SJC has provided a more reasonable threshold requirement for defendants
than the United States Supreme Court, which has made it practically impossible for
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In two racial profiling cases decided on the same day as Lora,
the SJC held that the defendants were not entitled to the discovery
they had requested from the Commonwealth pursuant to Rule 14 of
the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.97 The court rea
soned that unless a defendant can make a preliminary showing that
a reasonable basis exists to require the information sought, the dis
covery rule cannot be used “to impose such an onerous burden on
the Commonwealth.”98 In the first case, Commonwealth v.
Betances, the defendant was charged with trafficking heroin and co
caine after he was stopped for driving erratically.99 In the second
case, Commonwealth v. Thomas, the defendant was charged with
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute after he was
stopped for speeding and failure to operate in the right travel
lane.100 Both defendants sought discovery from the Common
wealth that would have aided them in making a Lora-like suppres
sion motion, but in both cases, the SJC rebuffed their efforts.101
Still, the court noted that “a properly presented and documented
motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(2) . . . may be an appropriate
defendants to obtain discovery from the government. See supra Part II.A. In Armstrong, the defendants sought evidence from the government regarding the prosecution
of cocaine offenses in federal court in their effort to demonstrate race-based selective
prosecution. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458-59. The Supreme Court held that they “failed
to satisfy the threshold showing: They failed to show that the Government declined to
prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races.” Id. at 458. Because the evidence
they provided of race-based prosecution was not sufficient to entitle them to obtain
discovery from the prosecution, the defendants were effectively barred from substanti
ating their selective enforcement claim.
97. See Commonwealth v. Betances, 886 N.E.2d 679 (Mass. 2008); Common
wealth v. Thomas, 886 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 2008). Rule 14(a)(1)(A) of the Massachusetts
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
the Commonwealth to furnish facts and information “relevant to the case and
. . . in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor, persons under the
prosecutor’s direction and control, or persons who have participated in investi
gating or evaluating the case and either regularly report to the prosecutor’s
office or have done so in the case.”
Betances, 886 N.E.2d at 682. Another avenue for discovery is through Rule 14(a)(2),
which permits the defendant to move for discovery of “other material and relevant
evidence not required by subdivision (a)(1).” Id. at 683 n.6 (internal quotations
omitted).
98. Id. at 683.
99. Id. at 680-81.
100. Thomas, 886 N.E.2d at 685.
101. See Betances, 886 N.E.2d at 683 (finding that the defendant’s discovery mo
tion, accompanied by two unrelated police reports noting the races of the arrestees, did
not “contain reliable information . . . demonstrating a reasonable basis to infer that
profiling” had occurred); Thomas, 886 N.E.2d at 686-87 (finding that the defendant’s
discovery motions, seeking materials from the arresting officer that would demonstrate
the occurrence of racial profiling, “were vague and overbroad”).
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vehicle by which a defendant . . . may obtain statistical evidence
required, under the Lora decision, to demonstrate [racial
profiling].”102
In two subsequent statutory rape cases, the SJC was presented
with similar Rule 14 discovery motions, and in both cases, the court
found in favor of the defendant.103 Commonwealth v. Bernardo B.
illuminates the importance of Rule 14 discovery for defendants
seeking to demonstrate selective enforcement.104 There, a four
teen-year-old boy was charged with nine counts of sexual offenses
for consensual acts he engaged in with three younger female
peers.105 Since the girls were not charged, though they had also
violated the law, the boy sought discovery “in order to investigate
and, if possible, support his claim that he was being selectively pros
ecuted because of his [sex].”106 The court wondered where else
than the prosecutor’s office could the boy “look to. . . as the most
comprehensive, reliable source of raw information from which to
develop” his selective enforcement claim.107
The Commonwealth’s argument in opposition tracked the gov
ernment’s in Armstrong—that the defendant’s request failed to
raise a reasonable inference that the prosecutor had declined to
prosecute “similarly situated individuals.”108 Yet, the SJC—unlike
the Supreme Court—recognized that requiring this kind of showing
“put[s] the cart before the horse.”109 The court explained that:
“[t]he reasonable inference” standard asks whether the defen
dant, seeking dismissal of the charges against him, has made a
prima facie case of selective prosecution. What the boy seeks
here is discovery, not dismissal. At the discovery stage, the ques
102. Thomas, 886 N.E.2d at 687.
103. See Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010); Com
monwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834 (Mass. 2009). In Washington W., the defen
dant alleged selective prosecution based on sexual orientation. Washington W., 928
N.E.2d at 910. The SJC found that the defendant was “foreclosed from making a
proper threshold showing of relevance, in light of the facts of the case and the inaccessi
ble nature of juvenile court records.” Id. at 914. Still, the court ruled that “the juve
nile’s claim is sufficiently serious to warrant further inquiry.” Id. Therefore, the court
ordered limited discovery that would potentially enable the defendant to make a show
ing of relevance, such that would entitle him to full discovery. Id. at 915.
104. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d. 834.
105. Id. at 837. At the time of the sexual encounters, the defendant was fourteen,
two of the females were twelve, and one was eleven. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 843.
108. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
109. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d at 843 (internal quotations omitted).
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tion is whether the defendant has made a “threshold showing of
relevance” under rule 14(a)(2). To adopt the higher burden sug
gested by the Commonwealth would place criminal defendants in
the untenable position of having to produce evidence of selective
enforcement in order to obtain evidence of selective
enforcement.110

Applying this legal standard, the court held that the defendant had
indeed made a threshold showing by demonstrating that his “be
havior was [not] so dissimilar from that of the girls in nature, kind,
and degree as to nullify the possibility that his discovery request
might yield information relevant to a claim of selective prosecu
tion.”111 Accordingly, he was entitled to the requested discovery.112
Over the past quarter century, the SJC has developed a strong
body of law for Massachusetts defendants seeking to demonstrate
selective enforcement. The earlier cases, King and Franklin, estab
lished the tripartite burden, which Lora reaffirmed.113 In their ef
forts to meet their initial burden, defendants may employ statistical
evidence and are able to obtain discovery from the Commonwealth
in order to corroborate their claims.114 These are all valuable tools
for protecting defendants from impermissible discrimination in the
enforcement and prosecution of criminal laws. What the law lacks,
however, is an acknowledgment of privilege—the inverse of dis
crimination—which functions implicitly in many selective enforce
ment cases.
110. Id. at 843-44 (citation omitted). The SJC makes no reference to United
States v. Armstrong in its decision. But with this statement, it clearly rejects the Su
preme Court’s established legal standard for defendants seeking discovery in selective
enforcement claims, establishing, as is its prerogative, greater protections for the citi
zens of Massachusetts than for the citizens of the United States.
111. Id. at 846. The SJC also found that the defendant’s requests were material
and relevant to his claim of sex-based selective prosecution, and that they were properly
supported. Id. at 847.
112. Id. at 846.
113. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (internal quota
tions, citations, and ellipses omitted). The SJC in Lora explained that
In order to meet [the initial] burden, the defendant must . . . present evidence
which raises at least a reasonable inference of impermissible discrimination,
including evidence [1] that a broader class of persons than those prosecuted
has violated the law, [2] that failure to prosecute was either consistent or delib
erate, and [3] that the decision not to prosecute was based on an impermissible
classification such as race, religion, or sex.
Id. As previously discussed, this standard was originally set forth in Commonwealth v.
Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 233-34 (Mass. 1978).
114. See Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010); Ber
nardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834; Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688.

318

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

III.

[Vol. 34:301

WHITE PRIVILEGE: VERY REAL, ENTIRELY
UNEARNED BENEFITS

Raising the issue of white privilege in his motion to dismiss for
selective prosecution would have provided Jason Vassell with mea
ger doctrinal justification upon which to rest his legal argument.
The law simply does not acknowledge the advantages and privileges
that white people experience in their encounters with law enforce
ment.115 At the same time, white privilege implicitly undergirds the
law of selective enforcement. The next segment of this Note pro
vides an overview of white privilege, a discussion of the case law’s
failure to engage in any meaningful discourse on white privilege,
and a look at how white privilege played a role in the arrest and
prosecution of Jason Vassell.
A. An Overview of White Privilege
“White privilege, a collective assortment of various conceptual
definitions,”116 has been described by scholars and activists in a va
riety of ways that range in form from highly technical dictionarylike definitions to narratives rich with real life examples.117 Peggy
McIntosh describes white privilege as an
invisible package of unearned assets which [a white person] can
count on cashing in each day, but about which [she or he] was
“meant” to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible
115. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 8 (“The notion of privilege, although part of the
consciousness of popular culture, has not been recognized in legal language and
doctrine.”).
116. Maurice R. Dyson, When Government is a Passive Participant in Private Dis
crimination: A Critical Look at White Privilege & the Tacit Return to Interposition in
PICS v. Seattle School District, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 164 (2008).
117. For an example of a dictionary-like definition of white privilege, see Defin
ing “White Privilege”, RACE, RACISM AND THE LAW: SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER!
http://academic.udayton.edu/race/01race/whiteness05.htm (last updated Dec. 31, 2010)
(describing white privilege as a “social relation” that can be manifested in a number of
ways, such as the “right[s], advantage[s], or immunit[ies] granted to or enjoyed by white
persons beyond the common advantage of all others”).
For an example of a narrative definition of white privilege, see Tim Wise, White
Privilege, White Entitlement and the 2008 Election, BUZZFLASH.COM (Sept. 13, 2008),
http://blog.buzzflash.com/contributors/1755. Wise provides the following examples of
white privilege:
[W]hen you can get pregnant at seventeen like Bristol Palin and everyone is
quick to insist that your life and that of your family is a personal matter, and
that no one has a right to judge you or your parents, because “every family has
challenges,” even as black and Latino families with similar “challenges” are
regularly typified as irresponsible, pathological and arbiters of social decay.
Id.
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weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools,
maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass,
emergency gear, and blank checks.118

The contents of the invisible knapsack benefit white people in
countless ways—from the comfort in finding members of their race
represented in textbooks and popular media, to never having to
wonder whether they were targeted by the police because of their
race in a traffic stop.119
In her article, Teaching Whren to White Kids, M. K. B. Darmer
describes an instance in which she experienced the comfort and se
curity of her white privilege when her vehicle was pulled over by a
police officer:
[D]espite a slight case of nerves, I was pretty sure of what would
happen and, more importantly, what would not happen: I would
not be frisked. I would not be pulled out of my car. I would not
be asked if I had a weapon. I would not be asked if there were
drugs in the car. I would not be asked if I had a criminal record.
I would not be treated harshly. My whiteness endows me with
benefits that were realized that day.120

Similarly, Jacob Willig-Onwuachi writes that he is “reminded of
[his] own white privilege when [he] shop[s]. . . and [is] neither fol
lowed around in stores nor asked to produce various forms of iden
tification when purchasing items.”121 Both of these accounts attest
118. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 17-18 (citing Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the
Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRITUALITY, Jan.-Feb. 1992 at 34).
119. Peggy McIntosh, in her essay, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knap
sack, available at http://www.nymbp.org/reference/WhitePrivilege.pdf (last visited Apr.
15, 2012), enumerates twenty-six ways in which she believes she benefits from white
privilege. Several examples include:
I can if I wish arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the
time . . . When I am told about our national heritage or about “civilization,” I
am shown that people of my color made it what it is . . . Whether I use checks,
credit cards or cash, I can count on my skin color not to work against the
appearance of my financial reliability . . . I am never asked to speak for all the
people of my racial group . . . I can be pretty sure that if I ask to talk to “the
person in charge,” I will be facing a person of my race [and] . . . If a traffic cop
pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax return, I can be sure I haven’t been
singled out because of my race.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 703 (Mass. 2008) (acknowledging
the problem of “police profiling, commonly referred to as ‘DWB—driving while
black.’”).
120. Darmer, supra note 27, at 113.
121. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, Special Project, A
House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
231, 232 (2009).
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to the large array of privileges that white people experience due
only to their skin color.122
White privilege, though exceedingly powerful, is largely unseen
by white people.123 One cause of its invisibleness to white people is
that “the characteristics of the privileged group define the societal
norm.”124 Imagine that every house you have ever seen in your
entire life were painted the color red. If this were so, you would not
necessarily notice when a friend painted her new home red. You
would not notice the color of your friend’s house, because as far as
you are concerned, there is nothing to notice. In your eyes, house
color = red. Similarly, when a white person “turn[s] on the televi
sion or open[s] to the front page of the paper [she or he] see[s]
122. The inverse is also true: people of color experience “a lack, an absence, a
deficiency” due to white privilege. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 17 (emphasis added).
When a black person “read[s] the newspaper, watch[es] television, or listen[s] to the
news . . . [she or he is bombarded with] negative and stereotypical images of black
people.” Onwuachi-Willig & Willig-Onwuachi, supra note 121, at 222, 232. When Joey
Mazzarino, head writer of Sesame Street, observed his daughter—who is black—play
ing with her dolls, he noticed that she “wanted to have long blond hair and straight hair,
and she wanted to be able to bounce it around.” “I Love My Hair”: A Father’s Tribute
to his Daughter, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.npr.org/tem
plates/story/story.php?storyId=130653300. The societal norm of what hair should look
like has been defined by the privileged group (when white people purchase toys for
their children, it is easy to find their own physical attributes represented), and conse
quently people of color experience the absence of privilege in this context, as well.
123. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 17 (“[White] privilege is not visible to its holder;
it is merely there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the way things are.”). Mar
galynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness:
Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635, 645 (2008) (“While
mainstream thought in the United States would now consider white supremacy to be
morally repugnant and explicitly rejected, white privilege remains largely
unacknowledged.”).
Professors Darmer and Willig-Onwuachi are exceptions to the rule that white peo
ple do not perceive their white privilege. Certainly, some white people have strived to
perceive the privilege that their skin color affords them. Even those who make this
effort, however, doubtlessly fail to observe every instance of white privilege. And even
in instances where they observe their privilege, they may silently enjoy it because to
confront it would be uncomfortable or inconvenient. See infra notes 128-132 and ac
companying text.
124. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 13 (citation omitted); see also BRUCE A. JA
COBS, RACE MANNERS: NAVIGATING THE MINEFIELD BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE
AMERICANS 106 (1999). Jacobs describes the normalization of whiteness:
[W]hite culture [is kept] firmly at the center of approved American reality
while the perceived “ethnic” cultures whirl about as orbiting social satellites.
By this definition, the sound of salsa music blaring from an apartment window
and the wafting aroma of a black chicken-and-ribs restaurant are both “eth
nic,” while the munching of a tuna sandwich on white bread by a white AngloSaxon man in green pants is, hysterically enough, “normal.”
Id.
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people of [her or his] race widely represented.”125 Because the so
cietal norm is defined by whiteness,126 white people commonly fail
to perceive whiteness and fail to question the privileges it confers
upon them.127
Another reason why white privilege is largely invisible to white
people is due to their inclination to “rely on their privilege and
avoid objecting to oppression.”128 Describing an experience that
she had while performing jury duty, Stephanie Wildman recalls how
she considered challenging the racist assumptions made by an attor
ney during voir dire when she noticed that the attorney asked all
Asian-looking prospective jurors if they spoke English.129 She con
templated introducing herself in the following way: “I’m Stephanie
Wildman, I’m a professor of law, and yes, I speak English,” to call
attention to the attorney’s “subordinating conduct.”130 Instead, she
decided to “opt out” and exercise her privilege by remaining silent
on the matter.131 Even white people who are committed to chal
lenging oppression can fall back into the comfort of their privilege
when it would be inconvenient or uncomfortable to do so. Thus,
“the implicit option to ignore oppression” is yet another object of
value in the invisible knapsack.132

125. McIntosh, supra note 119.
126. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 14 (“The characteristics and attributes of those
who are privileged group members are described as societal norms—as the way things
are and as what is normal in society.”) (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 17 (stating that “[p]rivilege is not visible to its holder; it is merely
there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the way things are”); see also Coker,
supra note 19, at 870 (“Whites seldom think of themselves through the lens of race;
whiteness is invisible to most whites.”).
128. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 13.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 13-14. White privilege, as understood by scholars like Professors
Wildman, Darmer, and McIntosh builds upon the “black critical reflection on the ways
and means of whiteness.” Ronald E. Chennault, Giving Whiteness a Black Eye: An
Interview with Michael Eric Dyson, in WHITE REIGN: DEPLOYING WHITENESS IN
AMERICA 305 (Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds., 1998). The contemporary study of white
ness owes a great “debt to [the] hidden black intellectual tradition” of W.E.B. DuBois,
Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, and Fannie Lou Hamer, among others. Id.
While a discussion of these origins is beyond the scope of this Note, the author wishes
to acknowledge this debt.
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B. Blind-Spots and Belittlement: How the Case Law Has
Regarded White Privilege
Despite the reality of white privilege133 and the rich documen
tation of its existence by both academics and activists, the courts
have never considered the topic in any meaningful way. A Westlaw
search of all state and federal cases for decisions that contain the
phrase “white privilege” produces seventeen results.134 Two cases
document “[t]he efforts of non-Native American adherents to
adopt Indian religions” and how in their efforts they may benefit
from white privilege.135 Several other cases operate in the employ
ment discrimination context, and generally characterize white privi
lege as a concept that provides an exceedingly unpersuasive basis
upon which to rest any legal reasoning.136 One case addresses the
133. Some people deny the existence of white privilege. Tim Wise responds to
the “deniers” in his blog piece, Explaining White Privilege to the Deniers and the Haters,
RED ROOM (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.redroom.com/blog/tim-wise/explaining-white
privilege-deniers-and-haters.
134. Westlaw Search of “All State and Federal Cases,” https://law
school.westlaw.com (follow “Westlaw” hyperlink; then search “Terms & Connectors”
for “white privilege”). Six of these cases do not address white privilege, but rather
contain misleading phrases, which the search engine is not capable of distinguishing,
such as “White’s privilege” (referring to the defendant, White, and his privilege against
self-incrimination). See United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1516 (Ind. 1989); see also
Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1980); I.C.C. v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1980);
White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 1986 WL 965, No. 03-0051-H (W.D. Va., June
12, 1986); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44 (N.D. Cal 1971); Munroe v.
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 254 S.W. 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
135. See United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137, 1154-55 (D. Utah
2009) for an example of a court inquiring into whether non-Native Americans who
adhere to Native American religions should be entitled to possess eagle feathers for
religious purposes in violation of existing federal laws designed to protect endangered
bird species. The court held that the government failed to demonstrate that its ban on
the possession of eagle feathers as applied to the non-native American defendants was
“the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests.” Id. In dicta, the
court described how some commentators decry the efforts of “New Agers” to “play
Indian” by appropriating Native American religions all the while retaining “the white
privilege and power to make themselves heard at the expense of [N]ative Americans.”
Id. at 1137; see also United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009)
(dealing with the same issue as Hardman).
136. See Bowman-Farrell v. Cooperative Educ. Serv. Agency 8, No. 02-C-818,
2007 WL 3046283, at *6, *30 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 2007) (granting summary judgment to
defendants where plaintiffs argued that both racism and white privilege were responsi
ble for the discrimination they alleged to have occurred); Wilcoxon v. Ramsey Action
Programs, Inc., No. 04-92 (JRT/FLN), 2005 WL 2216289, at *2, *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 12,
2005) (granting summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff had circulated an
email on white privilege prior to her dismissal); Scott v. Univ. of N.H. Co-op Extension,
No. 03-027-M, 2004 WL 235258, at *3 n.5, *4, *10 (D.N.H., Feb. 9, 2004) (granting
summary judgment to the defendant after noting that “[the plaintiff’s] invocation of
‘white privilege,’ without more, is insufficient to state a claim under Title VII”); Cole
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constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).137 In
her dissent, the Honorable Bobbe J. Bridge analogizes DOMA to
“segregation laws [once] sought to ‘defend’ white-privilege from
people of color.”138 Though some courts may recognize the exis
tence of white privilege, none of them has engaged with it in any
meaningful way.
The single Supreme Court decision wherein the phrase, “white
privilege” appears is Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Se
attle School District.139 There, the Court held that the goal of creat
ing racially diverse schools must not be achieved by way of
“assigning students on a racial basis.”140 In his concurrence, Justice
Thomas extolled a “color-blind Constitution” that cannot tolerate
“[elite] racial theories [such as] cultural racism141 [or] white privi
lege.”142 Justice Thomas provided these two concepts as examples
of what happens when “local school boards . . . [are] entrusted with
the power to make decisions on the basis of race.”143 Thomas’s
quip suggests that it is repugnant for a school board to encourage
man v. Exxon Chem. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 593, 622 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that a
white employee’s opinions on an article entitled “White Privileges” that amounted to a
criticism of affirmative action was not the equivalent of racial bias in a Title VII em
ployment discrimination claim); Rylander v. Hasart, 2001 WL 1346791, No. 25675-4-II,
at *4, *12 (Wash. App. Div. Nov. 2, 2001) (rejecting on relevancy grounds the white
male plaintiff’s argument that materials on white privilege viewed by a hiring commit
tee demonstrated “an intent to inject race into the . . . hiring process”). But see Miller
v. Cont’l Can Co., 544 F. Supp. 210, 229 (D.C. Ga. 1981) (noting that the delay in
making a merger between pulp and paper mills “of approximately two years [was a]
vain attempt to protect white privilege”).
137. Anderson v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1010 (Wash. 2006) (holding that
“Washington’s long-standing definition of marriage as the union of one man and one
woman and DOMA are both constitutional”).
138. Id. at 1030 (Bridge, J. dissenting). Justice Bridge’s use of the phrase, “white
privilege,” seems to connote “white supremacy,” a different—more deliberate and
overt—system of domination. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?: Explor
ing the Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 165 (2009) (describing a societal and economic struc
ture based on white privilege as “seemingly less-virulent . . . [and] more-benign” than
the structure of white supremacy that preceded it).
139. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 781 n.30
(2007).
140. Id. at 747.
141. Justice Thomas cited a former Seattle school district website containing the
following definition of cultural racism: “Those aspects of society that overtly and co
vertly attribute value and normality to white people and whiteness, and devalue, stereo
type, and label people of color as ‘other,’ different, less than, or render them invisible.”
Id. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J. concurring).
142. Id. at 781.
143. Id. at 781 n.30.
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members of its community to engage in any sort of dialogue on
matters having to do with power and privilege.
None of these cases provides any legal language or frameworks
with which to discuss white privilege.144 Though not all courts dis
parage the concept of white privilege in the manner of one Su
preme Court justice,145 none considers it meaningfully or even
attempts to carve out a narrow entryway through which the concept
might be introduced to legal doctrine.146 Far from being an elitist
theory,147 white privilege affects criminal defendants’ experiences
in very real ways. Still, it seems that white privilege remains invisi
ble in the courtroom.
C. The Function of White Privilege in Commonwealth v. Vassell
Vassell’s motion to dismiss for selective prosecution identified
racism as a motivating factor in much of the UMPD’s conduct and
the DA’s handling of the case.148 Undoubtedly, Vassell and his at
torneys were aware of the role that white privilege played in his
case. No formal mechanism existed, however, by which they could
raise the issue. Consequently, they were confined to identifying ra

144. Professor Wildman describes how “privilege . . . has [never] found articula
tion in the legal vocabulary.” WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 141.
145. See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch., 551 U.S. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J.
concurring).
146. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
147. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J. concurring).
148. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 46 (stating that “racism is the only plau
sible explanation for the criminal charges . . . pending” against Vassell). Certainly there
was good reason to identify racism as playing a role in the prosecution. After all, “Ja
son Vassell was the target of a racist hate crime,” Jason’s Story, JUSTICE FOR JASON,
http://www.justiceforjason.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012), and yet the DA refused to
recognize this fact at any stage in the prosecution. See Commonwealth’s Opposition,
supra note 4. The DA described the Commonwealth’s “race neutral factual basis for
[Vassell’s] indictment” as stemming from the “defendant’s acts of repeatedly stabbing,
without legal justification or excuse, two unarmed men.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
That Vassell was “terrified” when Bowes and Bosse attacked him—that he believed “if
[he didn’t] do something, [he would] die”—played no role in the prosecution’s handling
of the case. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 11 (internal quotations omitted). Re
cording artist and UMass student Giddens W. Rateau described the racism underlying
Vassell’s prosecution in the following way: “[Bowes and Bosse] tried to steal his rights
. . . / But then Jason saved his life with a pocketknife / But here’s the great schism / You
look me in my eye and say he’s going to prison?” Justice for Jason Campaign at UMass
Amherst, YOUTUBE at 2:10 (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9gnyFv
XXh8.
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cism as the cause of the differential treatment afforded the partici
pants of the February 3rd altercation.149
Before discussing the function of white privilege in Common
wealth v. Vassell, this section provides a summary of the court pro
ceedings dealing with Vassell’s Motion to Dismiss for selective
prosecution. Many of Vassell’s arguments allude to white privilege
in the same way that the selective enforcement legal standard does:
both illuminate the invisible knapsack without ever explicitly nam
ing it or its contents.
1. Jason Vassell’s Motion to Dismiss for Selective
Prosecution
On December 29, 2008, Vassell’s counsel filed a motion to dis
miss the charges against him on the grounds of selective prosecu
tion.150 In the memorandum of law in support of this motion,
defense counsel noted that “[p]rior to raising the specter of an im
permissible motive in this case, [they had] conducted a rigorous
evaluation of the evidence and sought alternative explanations for
each questionable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”151 How
ever, the motion argued, a conclusion that the DA had engaged in
race-based selective prosecution was unavoidable.152 As evidence
of this claim, defense counsel argued that Bosse, who was not
charged with any crime, could have been charged with four sepa
rate felonies “as either a principal or joint venturer with Bowes.”153
At a minimum, Vassell’s attorneys argued, Bosse should have been
149. In oral argument for Vassell’s Motion for Discovery, Attorney David Hoose
explained, “we don’t make the[se] allegations lightly. I’m not suggesting for a minute
that [the prosecutors have] a Ku Klux Klan flag in their office, or that someone at some
point in time said, ‘He’s black. Let’s just prosecute a black person.’ Racism is a lot
more subtle than that.” Hearing on Motion for Discovery before the Honorable Judd
Carhart at 12, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 18,
2009) [hereinafter Discovery Hearing]. Although Attorney Hoose may have been re
ferring to less explicit forms of racism such as unconsciously-held bias, see supra note
27 and accompanying text, he may also have been alluding to white privilege as a sub
tler relation to racism.
150. Lawyers File Motion to Dismiss; Cite Racist Selective Prosecution, JUSTICE
FOR JASON, http://www.justiceforjason.org/motion (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
151. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 46.
152. Id. at 51.
153. Id. at 37. The four separate felonies enumerated were: Civil Rights Viola
tion with Bodily Injury, Assault or Battery for Purpose of Intimidation, Entering with
out Breaking at Night with Intent to Commit a Felony, and Malicious Destruction of
Property. Id.
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prosecuted for five separate misdemeanor offenses.154 Addition
ally, the motion asserted that the Commonwealth failed to prose
cute Bowes as aggressively as his conduct warranted, which
“demonstrated [an] indifference to the fate of Jason Vassell, as well
as [to] the safety of other people of color in the community.”155 All
this evinced that “the District Attorney [had] engaged in selective
prosecution on the basis of race.”156 Accordingly, defense counsel
argued that the indictment should have been dismissed.157
To further pursue the claim of selective prosecution, Vassell’s
counsel filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 14 of the
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.158 This request be
came the subject of much dispute, resulting in a review by a single
SJC Justice.159 Finally, on October 7, 2009, a Superior Court Order
ruled in favor of Vassell’s motion, finding that “[he had] met his
burden of showing that the [discovery requests were] material and
relevant to his claim of race-based selective prosecution.”160
154. Id. at 42-43. The five separate misdemeanors enumerated were: Assault and
Battery, Threat to Commit a Crime, Disorderly Conduct, Defacement of Injury to State
Building, and Trespass on Public Property. Id. at 43.
155. Id. at 51. Later, defense counsel argued that “the Commonwealth intention
ally pulled its punches both before and during the Bowes’ [sic] trial in order to avoid
casting further doubt on the constitutionality of its prosecution of Mr. Vassell.” Motion
to Strike, supra note 5, at 3. Specifically, defense counsel noted that the Common
wealth had moved to amend the charges against Bowes “[to strike] the words ‘with
injury.’” Id. at 4. By amending the charges, the Commonwealth was free to prosecute
Bowes in District, rather than, Superior Court. Id. at 5. Additionally, defense counsel
called attention to the fact that the Commonwealth assented to Bowes’s motion to dis
miss the assault and battery charge against him. Id. at 5-6. Defense counsel also
“moved in limine to exclude video evidence of a drunken Bowes taunting and threaten
ing Mr. Vassell before punching him in the face.” Id. at 7. Vassell’s defense counsel
documented other ways in which the Commonwealth appeared to have sabotaged its
case against Bowes. Id. at 8-18. All this, Vassell’s counsel argued, demonstrated “that
[the] prosecutors decided that they would rather lose the District Court case against
John Bowes than complicate the Superior Court case against Jason Vassell.” Id. at 7.
156. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 51.
157. Id. at 52. In the Commonwealth’s Preliminary Memorandum of Law in Op
position to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the prosecution averred that the deci
sion to arrest Jason Vassell was not based on race despite the “regrettable [use of]
profanity” by an officer of the UMPD. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at
12. The DA did not argue, however, that the decision to prosecute Vassell was free of
race-based taint. Rather, the DA argued that the court should defer to “the decisions
. . . of executive officers” to avoid the “unnecessary impair[ment of] the performance of
a core executive constitutional function.” Id. at 9.
158. Motion for Discovery, supra note 95.
159. Further Findings and Order at 2, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008
00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Discovery Order].
160. Id. at 11.
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Despite the DA’s effort to characterize Bowes and Bosse as
victims,161 the Superior Court found that “[Vassell’s] behavior was
sufficiently similar to that of Bowes and Bosse ‘in nature, kind and
degree’ to demonstrate the possibility that his discovery requests
might yield information relevant to his claim of selective prosecu
tion.”162 Specifically, the court noted that:
Vassell was charged with serious offenses in the Superior Court,
while Bowes was only charged with arguably less serious offenses
which were significantly reduced on motion by the Common
wealth. The Commonwealth’s decision not to proceed against
161. See Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4. The DA objected to defense
counsel’s portrayal of Bowes and Bosse as similarly situated to Vassell. Id. at 10. In its
memorandum, the Commonwealth argued that “[Vassell] was the only person armed,
and thus the only person inflicting knife wounds . . . Bosse and Bowes were not simi
larly situated to him.” Id. The Commonwealth’s telling of the events that occurred on
February 3, 2008 seems aimed at portraying Bowes and Bosse as having been drawn
into the fight rather than having instigated it:
Bowes and Bosse . . . stopped at the defendant’s street level room window to
ask for assistance for entry into the building. . . . A verbal argument between
the defendant and Bowes ensued. As the men argued, Bowes cursed at the
defendant by uttering profanity and racial epithets or slurs. The encounter
culminated in one of the defendant’s room window panes . . . being broken.
Id. at 4. The memorandum employs the passive voice to describe the broken window,
thereby enabling the Commonwealth to avoid addressing the issue of who broke the
window. The memorandum described the altercation in the lobby in the following way:
[T]he defendant raised the knife in a threatening manner towards Bowes and
Bosse on multiple occasions . . . . Bowes reached over . . . and punched the
defendant’s upper body to disarm him. . . . The defendant responded by stab
bing Bowes repeatedly as he retreated toward the entrance door . . . . Bosse
. . . grabbed at the defendant, punching him, to stop him from stabbing Bowes.
In response, the defendant stabbed Bosse, repeatedly . . . as Bosse retreated
away from the defendant toward the inner security door . . . . No further
physical interaction occurred between the men and the defendant left the
lower lobby . . . .
Id. at 7. This telling of the events portrays Vassell as the aggressor and Bowes and
Bosse as the victims. As such it differs greatly from the account corroborated by multi
ple eyewitnesses. See supra Part I; see also Petition for Relief, supra note 5. Further
more, the DA’s narrative omits the fact that Bowes and Bosse sought to engage with
Vassell after he had fled the room. See supra Introduction.
162. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 8. Attorney Hoose argued that “[the
black defendant and his white counterparts] don’t have to be identically situated. They
just have to be similarly situated.” Discovery Hearing, supra note 149, at 23 When the
court issued its discovery request, it stated that the parties were similarly situated for
purposes of the discovery request, but did not make a final determination on the issue
as it related to the motion to dismiss. See Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 7. Com
pare the Superior Court’s finding to the Supreme Court of the United States’ in Armstrong and other selective prosecution cases, which essentially permit “[c]ourts that are
hostile to selective prosecution claims [to] always find white comparators dissimilar.”
Coker, supra note 19, at 830.
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Bosse at all, and to reduce the charges against Bowes, despite the
evidence against them, while pursuing far more serious charges
against Vassell, further supports the reliance and materiality of
the discovery sought by Vassell.163

Before the Commonwealth had fully met its discovery obligations,
the DA offered to dismiss the charges against Vassell if he complied
with a pretrial probation order.164 Vassell accepted the offer and
his motion to dismiss was never heard on the merits.165
2. Bowes and Bosse as Beneficiaries of White Privilege
White privilege, in the form of benefits conferred upon Bowes
and Bosse, is the “flipside of [the] discrimination” experienced by
Vassell.166 In the immediate aftermath of the altercation, officers
from the UMPD treated Bowes and Bosse with familiarity and con
cern.167 One of the two officers who interviewed Bosse responded
to his admission to having had “a few beers”168 by joking, “I wish I
had a few beers . . . .”169 The second officer playfully admonished
Bosse, whose Tom Brady jersey had been taken into evidence, that
“[If the Patriots lose the upcoming Super Bowl] we’re going to give
your name to the Boston Globe. It’s all John’s fault.”170 This famil
iarity and friendliness was completely absent from the officers’ in
teractions with Vassell. By treating the participants to the
altercation in such a disparate manner, the UMPD privileged the
white participants over the black participant—disregarding the evi
dence that Vassell, in fact, was the victim.171
163. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 9.
164. Lowe, supra note 39. On August 3, 2010—two and a half years after the
February 3rd altercation—Vassell’s probationary period ended. Contrada, supra note
34. “According to the terms of his agreement, Vassell acknowledged stabbing Bowes
and Bosse and was allowed to serve out the 21/2-year pre-trial probationary period im
posed at his arraignment in 2008. He will have no criminal record because the charges
against him are expunged.” Id.
165. Contrada, supra note 34.
166. Wise, Explaining White Privilege, supra note 133 (explaining how “privilege
is the flipside of discrimination. If people of color face discrimination, in housing, em
ployment and elsewhere, then the rest of us are receiving a de facto subsidy, a privilege,
an advantage in those realms of daily life. There can be no down without an up . . .”).
167. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 14-17.
168. Id. at 13.
169. Id. at 14.
170. Id. at 16.
171. Bowes and Bosse had become repeat offenders, perhaps for the reason that
no one had ever addressed their criminal conduct with all due seriousness. Vassell’s
attorneys asserted that it was clear upon reviewing Bowes’s and Bosse’s police reports
that the men “had been given literally dozens of breaks by law enforcement yet contin

2012]

MODIFYING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT LAW

329

Certainly evidence of racial bias at this stage of the case is re
plete. On several occasions, Vassell was subjected to suspicious and
hateful conduct by the police.172 The same officer who joked about
wishing he had a few beers referred to Vassell as an “asshole” and
“donkey” while discussing the case with another officer.173 He
urged the second officer to interview Vassell while he was still le
thargic after receiving medical treatment.174 Additionally, he spec
ulated that Vassell was a drug dealer without any corroborating
evidence.175 This antagonism flourished in spite of the UMPD’s of
ficial and self-proclaimed charge to “[ensure] that all members of
our community live, work, and learn on campus without concerns
about safety.”176 So deep was the officers’ racial prejudice that they
chose to credit violent, white trespassers over a black member of
their community. That Bowes and Bosse benefited from this racial
prejudice is another example of white privilege.
White privilege continued to function at the prosecutorial
level. The charges made against Bowes were minor compared to
those against his victim.177 Furthermore, by striking “with injury”
from Count Two of the complaint against Bowes, the DA granted
Bowes another palpable privilege—the benefit of his case remain
ing in District rather than Superior Court.178
ued to commit random, and sometimes racist, acts of violence.” Second Supplemental
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Second Supplemen
tal Motion]. It is likely that the UMPD officers who interviewed Bowes and Bosse have
only encouraged their tendency towards lawlessness.
172. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 9-13.
173. Id. at 12.
174. Id. at 13. In contrast, one of the UMPD officers interviewing Bosse “elected
to conclude the interview based on his concern that the painkillers might be affecting
Bosse’s faculties.” Id. at 16.
175. Id. at 9.
176. UMASS AMHERST POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://www.umass.edu/umpd (last
visited Apr. 15, 2012).
177. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 35 (“Vassell face[d] a maximum sentence
of thirty years in state prison; Bowes face[d] a maximum sentence of four years in the
house of correction; and Bosse [had] not been charged with a single crime.”).
178. Id. at 35 (“In taking this action, the Commonwealth effectively turned a
blind eye to: (i) medical records that show Vassell’s nose was broken; (ii) its own appli
cation for a criminal complaint which states that Vassell’s nose was broken; [and] (iii)
. . . a statute that defines bodily injury to include fractures and even something as minor
as a subdural hematoma.”). Id.
The decision to amend Count Two by striking the reference to bodily injury re
duced the maximum penalty Bowes faced for that offense from ten years in state prison
to one year in the house of correction. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 265 § 37 (2008)
(“Any person convicted of violating this provision shall be . . . imprisoned not more
than one year . . . ; and if bodily injury results, shall be punished by . . . imprisonment

330

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:301

Vassell’s counsel argued in the motion to dismiss that the his
tory of racially motivated violence and general misfeasance exhib
ited by Bowes and Bosse should have played a role in the DA’s
decision-making.179 The same day that the UMPD officer joked
with Bosse about his Tom Brady jersey, a Milton, Massachusetts
police officer forwarded several reports documenting Bowes’s and
Bosse’s involvement in similar incidents to the UMPD.180 From
these reports, the DA learned that Bowes and Bosse had a long
history of engaging in disorderly and hateful conduct.181 Their past
conduct, however, seemed to play no role whatsoever in the DA’s
decision-making. One would assume that a DA who aggressively
prosecutes a student for defending himself against a racially moti
vated attack would also aggressively prosecute two violent youths
for not more than ten years . . . .”). This reduction was required to permit the prosecu
tion to proceed in District rather than Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Zawat
sky, 670 N.E.2d 969, 972-74 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (concluding that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear a case involving an allegation of a civil rights violation result
ing in bodily injury). Interestingly, the DA did not move to amend Count Three, which
charged Bowes with inflicting a bodily injury in the midst of violating Section 39 of
Chapter 265 of the Massachusetts General Laws. Under this statute:
Whoever commits an assault or a battery upon a person . . . with the intent to
intimidate such person because of such person’s race . . . shall be punished . . .
by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than two and one-half
years . . . . Whoever commits a battery in violation of this section and which
results in bodily injury shall be punished by . . . imprisonment in the state
prison for not more than five years . . . .
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 §§ 39(a)-(b) (2008). Pursuant to another statute, the District
and Superior Courts have dual jurisdiction over “all felonies punishable by imprison
ment in the state prison for not more than five years.” MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 218 § 26
(2008). Accordingly, it appears clear that when the prosecution amended Count Two to
remove the allegation of bodily injury it did so for the sole purpose of keeping the case
against Bowes in District Court.
This exercise of prosecutorial discretion stood in stark contrast to decision-making
which occurred in the case against Vassell. Although the crimes he was charged with
committing—two counts of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon resulting in
serious bodily injury—could have been prosecuted in District Court, the DA elected to
proceed in Superior Court and thereby increased the potential penalty Vassell faced
from five years in the house of correction to thirty years in state prison. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ch. 265 § 15A(c)(1) (2008) (“Whoever . . . by means of a dangerous
weapon, commits an assault and battery upon another and by such assault and battery
causes serious bodily injury . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
for not more than 15 years or in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years
. . . .”) (emphasis added).
179. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 18.
180. Id. at 18-21.
181. See id.; Second Supplemental Motion, supra note 171, at 3-10 (enumerating
close to ten incidents in which Bowes and Bosse allegedly perpetrated violent and
sometimes racially-motivated attacks).
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for trespassing and attacking the student in his dormitory.182 In
stead, the DA chose to treat the white offenders with kid gloves:
another instance of white privilege.
IV. MAKING WHITE PRIVILEGE VISIBLE

IN THE

COURTROOM

By focusing on whether defendants of color are treated differ
ently because of their race, existing selective enforcement law fails
to identify a principal factor contributing to the differential applica
tion of criminal laws—white privilege. Professor Wildman de
scribes how antidiscrimination advocates may “focus only on one
portion of the power system, the subordinated characteristic, rather
than seeing the essential links between domination, subordination,
and the resulting privilege.”183 In a similar manner, selective en
forcement law has typically focused on a single “portion of the
power system”184—how defendants are targeted because of their
protected characteristics.185
Within the legal field, where the goal is the administration of
justice, serious shortfalls occur when powerful mechanisms of injus
tice are kept invisible.186 Until white privilege is made visible, legal
professionals cannot effectively address systemic racial injustice.187
Professor Wildman writes:
182. See Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at
12, 14, Commonwealth v. Vassell, HSCR 2008-00056 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2009)
[hereinafter Supplemental Motion] (discussing how pursuant to the Prosecution Stan
dards promulgated by the National District Attorneys’ Association, the DA “was
obliged ‘to make a charging determination which appropriately reflected the offense
and the offender . . .’ [and] because Bosse’s criminal conduct both in and outside [Vas
sell’s dormitory] was so repugnant, the District Attorney’s refusal to seek criminal
charges against him is indefensible”) (brackets omitted).
183. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 19.
184. Id.
185. In Commonwealth v. Franklin, the defendants argued that they were
targeted because of being black. Commonweath v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 232
(1978). In Commonwealth v. King, the defendants argued that they were targeted be
cause of being female. Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 204 (1977). While the
function of privilege remains obfuscated, these protected characteristics—race and
sex—become the explicit focus of the inquiry. Conversely, an inquiry accounting for
privilege would pose the following questions: Why did the police fail to arrest the white
members of the Maverick Street Housing Project for their violent acts? Why did the
Boston police opt not to arrest male prostitutes and male customers of prostitutes?
186. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 8 (“[The] failure to acknowledge privilege, to
make it visible in legal doctrine, creates a serious gap in legal reasoning rendering law
unable to address issues of systemic unfairness.”). See also Davis, supra note 25, at 52
(“[S]ociety has an interest in a fair and nondiscriminatory criminal justice system.”).
187. See, for example, Coker, supra note 19, at 862 on systemic racial injustice in
the administration of criminal laws (discussing “a system that systemically and dispro
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The rule of law can operate in conjunction with justice only
where its substantive content is codified . . . . Only when we dis
cuss what has been invisible can any movement toward justice
occur. Examining privilege is a way to make these power systems
visible. The rule of law has focused on discriminatory, differen
tial treatment, not on privilege. As a result these systems
remain.188

Codifying white privilege into the law of selective enforcement is
necessary, then, to advance the “movement toward justice.”189 As
long as white privilege remains invisible in the courtroom, there will
be no incentive for law enforcement to contend with the ways in
which it results in selective enforcement. As long as white privilege
remains invisible, judges will be unequipped to remediate its ef
fects. As long as white privilege remains invisible, some members
of the legal community will continue to imagine that it does not
exist.190 As long as white privilege remains invisible, it will persist.
The next segment of this Note proposes a modification to ex
isting selective enforcement law in Massachusetts and argues that
the modification is imperative in order to prevent hostile courts
from too readily dismissing selective enforcement claims. A second
segment identifies additional benefits that may result from the ex
plicit recognition of white privilege. In conclusion, this Note urges
the SJC to modify the law of selective enforcement to account for
white privilege.
A. A Proposed Modification to Massachusetts’s Selective
Enforcement Law
Under current Massachusetts law, a defendant wishing to
demonstrate selective enforcement “bears the initial burden to pre
sent evidence. . . [1] that a broader class of persons than those pros
ecuted violated the law. . . [2] that failure to prosecute was either
consistent or deliberate,. . . and [3] that the decision not to prose
cute was based on an impermissible classification.”191 Then, “[once
the defendant has] raised a reasonable inference of selective [en
portionately burdens communities of color with excesses of law enforcement without
many of the benefits”).
188. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 146.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Vargas-Vargas, supra note 27, at 56 (“Whites fail to recognize that a
legal system that consistently offers and protects white privilege will always seem objec
tive and rational from their perspective.”).
191. Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 843 (Mass. 2009).
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forcement] by presenting credible evidence that persons similarly
situated to himself have been deliberately or consistently not prose
cuted because of their race,” the burden shifts to the Common
wealth to “rebut that inference.”192 An implicit acknowledgement
of privilege is contained in the phrase, “persons similarly situated to
[the defendant who] have been deliberately or consistently not
prosecuted because of their race.”193 That is, defendants of color
are able to demonstrate selective enforcement when they present
evidence that white people who committed comparable offenses are
not prosecuted because of their race. This is white privilege pre
cisely. It would not be such a great leap conceptually for the law to
name explicitly that which it already implicitly acknowledges. Privi
lege, on the tip of the tripartite test’s tongue, needs only speaking
aloud.
To account for white privilege, this Note advocates that the fol
lowing language be added to the tripartite test:
Evidence that persons similarly situated to the defendant have
been deliberately or consistently not prosecuted because of their
race may include direct or statistical evidence that white offend
ers were not prosecuted or were prosecuted with less vigor as a
result of white privilege—the benefits conferred upon them for
no reason other than their skin color.

By permitting defendants to introduce evidence of white privilege
in support of their contention that white offenders similarly situated
to them have not been prosecuted due to their race, the modifica
tion takes the focus off of the defendants’ actions and resultant
charges, and more appropriately onto the white offenders’ actions
and law enforcement’s failure to bring (appropriate) charges
against them. Furthermore, the modification would provide the
practical benefit of preventing hostile courts from too readily dis
missing selective enforcement claims.
A court more hostile to Jason Vassell’s selective prosecution
claim might have ruled against him in his discovery request. The
focus in that matter was “whether Jonathan Bosse and John Bowes
could be considered ‘similarly situated’ to the defendant.”194 Ulti
mately, the court was willing to “[find] that Bowes’ [sic] and Bosse’s
192. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (internal quota
tions omitted).
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Motion for Discovery, supra note 95, at 2. Defense counsel sought discovery
from the Commonwealth in furtherance of its selective prosecution claim. A full discus
sion of the argument counsel made is beyond the scope of this Note.
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conduct was sufficiently similar to that of Vassell’s to conclude that
Vassell [had] made a threshold showing based on credible evidence
that he [was] entitled to discovery under Rule 14(a)(2) to investi
gate his claim of selective prosecution.”195 The court was able to
come to this conclusion without naming white privilege. However,
“courts hostile to selective prosecution claims may find that any
white comparator is not ‘similarly situated’” due to the improbabil
ity of the offenses being exactly identical in nature, timing, execu
tion, etcetera.196
The DA repeatedly made the argument that Bowes and Bosse
were not similarly situated to Vassell, because “[he] was the only
person armed, and thus the only person inflicting knife wounds.”197
In response, Vassell’s attorneys argued that Vassell and his attack
ers did not need to be “identically situated,” only similarly situ
ated.198 Similarity is an amorphous concept in this context.
According to Vassell’s attorneys, Bowes and Bosse were similar to
Vassell in two ways: they participated in the “same incident” and
they “committed serious felonies.”199 However, they were dissimi
lar to Vassell in one way that became the focal point for the DA:
they were not armed.200 If the court had been hostile—unwilling to
take seriously Vassell’s claim of selective prosecution—it could
have inflated this difference to permit it to find Bowes and Bosse
dissimilar to Vassell.201
If the law of selective enforcement accounted for white privi
lege, it would have been harder for a hostile court to dismiss a claim
like Vassell’s, or, at a minimum, to deny the defendant’s discovery
requests. Though it was not framed as such, Vassell’s preliminary
showing actually contained evidence of the sort described in the au
thor’s proposed modification: direct and statistical evidence that
white offenders were not prosecuted or were prosecuted with less
195. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 9.
196. Coker, supra note 19, at 847.
197. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 10.
198. Discovery Hearing, supra note 149, at 23.
199. Id. at 11.
200. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 10.
201. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 847-48 (discussing how an Eleventh Circuit
case found comparable offenders “not ‘similarly situated’ because [they] engaged in the
conduct only once or twice each while one defendant was alleged to have done so seven
times and a second defendant to have done so three times”). But see Commonwealth v.
Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 234 (Mass. 1978) (noting that “there are common sense dis
tinctions between using firearms and using rocks and firebombs . . . [but w]hen executed
with the requisite venom, all are crimes of violence involving the possibility of death or
serious bodily injury”).
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vigor as a result of white privilege. Vassell’s direct evidence con
sisted largely of Bowes’s and Bosse’s criminal records.202 Although
the two men had long criminal histories—in contrast to Vassell’s
unsullied record—one was not prosecuted (Bosse) and the other
was prosecuted with less vigor (Bowes) than the defendant.203 Hav
ing the benefit of a clean slate even after having made a habit of
criminal activity is direct evidence of white privilege.
Vassell also presented statistical evidence of white privilege.
He alleged that the UMPD may have had a practice of responding
to interracial altercations on the UMass Amherst campus by declin
ing to arrest and/or prosecute the white participants even while ar
resting and prosecuting participants of color.204 In support of this
allegation, the defense cited the prosecution of Demian Vennell, a
black man who came to the aid of another black man whom he
observed being violently assaulted by a white mob.205 Vennell was
arrested and charged; none of the white assailants were ever
charged.206 Essentially, Vassell’s attorneys argued that the Vennell
case demonstrated a statistical likelihood that the UMPD had en
gaged in or had a practice of engaging in selective enforcement.
Acknowledging that they “[did not] know what kind of statistics are
available to show how many interracial assaults are dealt with by
the [UMPD and DA],”207 defense counsel argued that the evidence
they had presented was sufficient to make a threshold showing in
support of additional discovery.208
202. See supra notes 171 and 181.
203. See Second Supplemental Motion, supra note 171, at 14 (discussing how the
National District Attorney Association’s Prosecution Standards provide that in consid
ering whether to prosecute an offender, the prosecutor should consider “[w]hether the
defendant is a first-time offender”).
204. Supplemental Motion, supra note 182, at 2.
205. Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 7-8.
206. Id. at 8.
207. Discovery Hearing, supra note 149, at 9.
208. As noted previously, the Superior Court agreed that this preliminary show
ing was sufficient and ordered that the Commonwealth produce:
1) all police reports, witness statements, and Grand Jury minutes in the case of
Commonwealth v. Demian Vennell . . .
2) any and all documentation showing the number of cases charged in Hamp
shire County in the past five years of assault and battery, assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon, and aggravated assault and battery with a danger
ous weapon, where the accused(s) and named victim(s) were of different racial
backgrounds; and
3) any and all documentation concerning the number of cases reported to the
Northwest District Attorney in the last five years of civil rights violations or
hate crimes, including cases where no formal charges resulted.
Discovery Order, supra note 159, at 1.
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Vassell’s evidence of white privilege would have been sufficient
to raise a “reasonable inference”209 of selective enforcement under
the proposed modification, and had he made his discovery motion
and motion to dismiss in a court hostile to selective enforcement
claims, his claim could not be so easily dismissed. Under the cur
rent law, the DA urged the court to consider whether the white
offenders were different from the black defendant in any way at
all.210 A hostile court could be easily persuaded by the DA’s argu
ment and could find that Bowes and Bosse were sufficiently dissimi
lar from Vassell so as to defeat his claim. The modification
proposed by this Note, however, would make it harder for such a
court to readily dismiss a selective enforcement claim on the
grounds that members of “a broader class of persons . . . [who] vio
lated the law” are not similarly situated to the defendant.211
B. Additional Benefits Resulting from the Proposed Modification
This Note has discussed how a failure to acknowledge white
privilege in the law of selective enforcement has perpetuated a “se
rious gap in legal reasoning.”212 Closing this gap is necessary to
permit the law of selective enforcement to address racial injustice
effectively. However, closing this gap could also lead to benefits
outside the law of selective enforcement; it could propel the con
cept of privilege into new territory—into other areas of law and
into white people’s consciousnesses.213
An explicit acknowledgement of white privilege in the selective
enforcement context may result in the courts recognizing other
forms of privilege214 and the function of privilege in other areas of
law. In the area of employment discrimination, for example, when
plaintiffs are required to demonstrate discriminatory intent, the law
fails to account for the fact that “discrimination has a systemic na
ture . . . includ[ing] the usually unseen hydra head of privilege.”215
209. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008).
210. Commonwealth’s Opposition, supra note 4, at 10.
211. Lora, 886 N.E.2d at 698 (quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d
227, 233-34 (Mass. 1978).
212. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 8.
213. See supra Part III.A on the invisibleness of white privilege to white people.
214. Other forms of privilege include classism, heterosexism, male privilege, and
able-ism. See generally Kristin Kalsem & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism,
18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 131, 157 (2010) (“Social justice feminism strives to uncover
and dismantle [patriarchal social and political structures] . . . such as white privilege,
heterosexism, able-ism, and classism.”).
215. WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 33.
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Recognizing privilege in this area of law would result in a more
complete “picture of the dynamic of subordination,” and would
support a legal system better suited to remedy discriminatory con
duct in the workplace.216 Recognizing privilege in any area of the
law may force reluctant judges to contend with it rather than resort
ing to a belittling or (willfully) blind posture.217
Furthermore, the formal incorporation of white privilege into
the law of selective enforcement could have a powerful effect on
our society even outside of the courtroom.218 When the Supreme
Court ruled in 1954 that race-based segregation of public school
children violated the Fourteenth Amendment, it based its opinion
almost entirely on an argument originating in social theory.219 The
Court reasoned that segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority
[amongst black school children] as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”220 Rejecting Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal”
doctrine, the Court noted that a plethora of psychological studies
and writings had amply documented the “detrimental effect” that
segregation had upon black children.221 By basing its decision on
216. Id. Wildman describes the error in the Supreme Court’s analysis in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), in the following way:
[I]t examines only discrimination and ignores privilege. A system of male
privilege means that men are setting the standard to which women must con
form . . . . An analysis of privilege . . . is necessary to examine the gender
power system and how decisions based on it in the workplace harm women.
WILDMAN, supra note 16, at 39.
217. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 781-82 (2007) (Thomas, J. concurring).
218. See generally Armstrong & Wildman, supra note 123 at 672 (discussing how
deepening our understanding of race, power, and privilege is necessary “to move this
diverse nation closer to the democratic ideal of ‘liberty and justice for all’”); Darmer,
supra note 27, at 132 (emphasizing that achieving social justice requires us to “expos[e]
racial disparities, not cover[ ]them up”).
219. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
220. Id. at 494.
221. Id. at 494-95; see also Michael W. Combs & Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisit
ing Brown v. Board of Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political Perspec
tive, 47 HOW. L.J. 627, 631 (2004) (discussing how “separate but equal . . . reflected and
symbolized the historical cultural tradition . . . [in which w]hites were elevated, while
African Americans were subordinated”). But see André Douglas Pond Cummings, A
Furious Kinship: Critical Race Theory and the Hip-Hop Nation, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 499, 526-27 (2010) for a discussion on Professor Derrick’s Bell’s belief “that the
Brown decision was made not to provide equal opportunity to blacks, but rather to
improve the image of the United States in the 1950s as the ‘bellwether’ nation of equal
ity to Third World nations, in particular to those that supported communism.”
The impact of Brown v. Board of Education on equality and access to education is
beyond the scope of this Note. For discussions on this topic see Maurice R. Dyson, De
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social and psychological findings, the Court lent a great deal of
credibility to the concept of internalized inferiority as stemming
from subordination. Similarly, were the courts to rely upon findings
developed under the rubric of white privilege social theory in selec
tive enforcement claims, the concept of white privilege may gain
the additional traction and acceptance necessary to cause white
members of our society to begin to “[i]dentify[ ] and confront[ ]
whiteness. . . moving the nation forward toward a more complete
realization of racial equality.”222
CONCLUSION
When something inimical remains invisible to a large group of
people, there is very little incentive for members of this group to
take any actions to address the harm.223 White privilege is largely
invisible to white people and the courts have never formally ac
knowledged it in any serious manner.224 However, as cases like
Facto Segregation & Group Blindness: Proposals for Narrow Tailoring Under a New
Viable State Interest in PICS v. Seattle School District, 77 UMKC L. REV. 697 (2009);
Preston C. Green, III et al., Achieving Racial Equal Educational Opportunity Through
School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283 (2008); Peter Halewood, Sympo
sium, Laying Down the Law: Post-Racialism and the De-Racination Project, 72 ALB. L.
REV. 1047 (2009); Amy Stuart Wells et al., Symposium, The Space Between School De
segregation Court Orders and Outcomes: The Struggle to Challenge White Privilege, 90
VA. L. REV. 1721 (2004). See also Ian F. Haney Lopez,
´
Post-Racial Racism: Racial
Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1023
(2010) (addressing the “compelling thesis that racialized mass incarceration stems from
backlash to the civil rights movement”).
222. Armstrong & Wildman, supra note 123, at 639.
223. For example, “greenhouse gases are invisible so that humans cannot tell
where they come from and how dense they are by sight.” Tsung-Sheng Liao, Surviving
by “Eating Coins” or Breathing with No Carbon Dioxide: The Dynamic Balance Model
to Resolve the Potential Conflicts Between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol, 16 CUR
RENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 28, 42 (2007). As a result, the serious problem of global
warming is not observed or taken seriously by many people. See generally Jules Lobel
& George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in
Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045 (2005) (discussing
how the public may react powerfully to visible environmental crises, such as smog, but
ignores invisible environmental threats, such as global warming). In order for the gen
eral public to care about global warming, it must be made visible. See Marc R. Poirier,
A Very Clear Blue Line: Behavioral Economics, Public Choice, Public Art and Sea
Level Rise, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 83, 92, 98 (2007) (describing “[the public’s
failure] to behave rationally with regard to information about the risk” of rising sea
level, and the resultant blue line projects, which “plac[e] beacons in parks, linked by [a]
chalk line,” depicting the encroaching sea level in a visible and meaningful way).
224. See supra Part III.A and Part III.B.
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Commonwealth v. Vassell illustrate, white privilege plays a very real
role in the administration of criminal laws.225
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Massachusetts Declara
tion of Rights prohibit law enforcement from applying the law un
equally.226 Yet, the courts cannot effectively address instances of
racial injustice in the enforcement of criminal laws until they con
tend with white privilege, a factor contributing to many instances of
selective enforcement. Furthermore, great benefits would likely re
sult in other areas of the law and in society at large if white privi
lege were acknowledged and made explicit in this context. For
these reasons, this Note advocates that the SJC account for white
privilege in the law of selective enforcement. One-hundred and
twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court applauded the state of
Massachusetts’s contribution to the law of equal protection.227
Massachusetts should, once again, forge ahead in furtherance of
equality.
Mara Shulman Ryan*

225. See supra Part II.C.2.
226. See Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 692 (Mass. 2008).
227. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[I]n the famous language
of the Massachusetts bill of rights, the government of the commonwealth ‘may be a
government of laws and not men.’”).
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2012. I dedicate this
Note to Luke, whose tremendous insight, intellect, and heart continually amaze me.

